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Abstract 
A paradox in international trade is that multilateral trade liberalisation has 
resulted in increases in both the volume of world trade and the amount of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). This note presents a Cournot duopoly model 
with two regions, each consisting of two countries, and with an inter-regional 
transport cost. It is shown that multilateral trade liberalisation may lead firms 
to switch from exporting to undertaking export-platform FDI when the inter-
regional transport cost is high. Also, when the inter-regional transport cost is 
high, the switch to FDI leads to an increase in the volume of world trade in 
this industry. 
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1. Introduction 
Multilateral trade liberalisation since the formation of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has led to an increase in the volume of world trade and an increase 
in the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) with many industries experiencing increases 
in both intra-industry trade and intra-industry FDI.1 The increase in FDI as a result of trade 
liberalisation is a paradox as the standard theoretical model (the proximity-concentration 
trade-off model) suggests that a reduction in trade costs would reduce the amount of 
horizontal FDI.2 Recently, Neary (2009) has discussed this paradox and considered possible 
explanations to resolve the paradox. One explanation is that economic integration by trade 
blocs has reduced intra-bloc trade costs and led to an increase in export-platform FDI where 
firms undertake FDI in one country to supply all the countries in the trade bloc.3 However, 
this approach does not really explain how multilateral trade liberalisation may lead to an 
increase in FDI, and does not address the effect on the volume of world trade. 
This note will present a model that explains how multilateral trade liberalisation 
(albeit in the presence of an inter-regional transport cost) can lead firms to shift from 
supplying markets by exporting to supplying markets by undertaking export-platform FDI 
when the inter-regional transport cost is high. Also, it is shown that this shift from exporting 
to undertaking export-platform FDI leads to an increase in the volume of world trade in this 
industry when the inter-regional transport cost is high. Therefore, when the inter-regional 
transport cost is high, this model can explain why multilateral trade liberalisation has led to 
an increase in FDI and an increase in the volume of world trade. 
                                                 
1 Stylised facts on FDI are presented in Markusen (2002, chapter 1) and Barba Navaretti and Venables 
(2004, chapter 1). 
2 Notable articles among the first strategic models of FDI are: Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Motta 
(1992) and Rowthorn (1992). 
3 See, inter alia, Norman and Motta (1993), Motta and Norman (1996) and Neary (2002). 
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2. The Model 
In this symmetric model, the world consists of two regions labelled A and B with two 
countries in each of the regions. The countries in region A are labelled one and two while the 
countries in region B are labelled three and four. There is a single firm based in each region 
that has incurred a sunk cost to build a factory in one of the countries in the region. Firm A, 
the firm in region A, has a factory in country one and firm B, the firm in region B, has a 
factory in country three. The firms produce a homogeneous product and compete as Cournot 
duopolists in the four markets that are assumed to be segmented. The firms each have 
constant marginal cost c , there is an inter-regional transport cost k , and each country has a 
specific import tariff t . In the ith country ( 1,2,3,4i = ) the inverse demand function for the 
homogeneous product is ( )i Ai BiP x xα β= − + , where iP  is the price, Aix  is the sales of firm A 
and Bix  is the sales of firm B. The firms can supply the markets either by exporting from their 
existing factories thereby incurring the import tariff on all exports and the inter-regional 
transport cost on inter-regional exports, or they can undertake FDI by building a factory in 
another country thereby incurring a sunk cost of FDI: G . 
Consider first the case when both firms supply all the markets by exporting from their 
existing factories thereby incurring the import tariff on all exports and the transport cost on 
inter-regional exports. In country one, firm A has marginal cost c  and firm B has marginal 
cost c k t+ +  while in country three the situation is reversed. In country two, firm A has 
marginal cost c t+  and firm B has marginal cost c k t+ +  while in country four the situation 
is reversed. Assuming an interior solution where all firms sell positive quantities in all 
markets, it is straightforward to show that the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs in the 
four markets are: 
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The output exported by firm A (B) to country three (one) will be positive if the sum of the 
import tariff and inter-regional transport cost ( ) 2k t cα+ < −  so the prohibitive tariff in 
countries one and three is ( )2 2t c kα≡ − − , which will be positive if it is assumed that 
( ) 2k cα< − . It will be assumed that the import tariff is less than the prohibitive tariff, 
t t< , as then both firms will sell positive quantities in all markets. For future reference, 
when comparing the volume of world trade, note that the total exports of firm A and, by 
symmetry, firm B are: 
 ( )2 3 4 1 2 43 43E E E E E E E EA A A A B B B B
c k t
X x x x x x x X
α
β
− − −= + + = = + + =  (2) 
Using the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs (1) to solve for the profits of the two 
firms in the four markets yields: 
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 (3) 
Since it is assumed that ( ) 2k t cα+ < − , both firms sell positive quantities in all markets 
and the profits of the firms are positive in all markets. 
3. Foreign Direct Investment 
Now consider the possibility that the firms undertake FDI by building a factory 
(incurring a sunk cost, G ) in one (or more) other countries thereby avoiding the import tariff 
and, in the case of inter-regional trade, avoiding the inter-regional transport cost. There are a 
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number of possible outcomes that need to be considered: firms may engage in intra-regional 
FDI where firm A (B) undertakes FDI in country two (four); firms may engage in inter-
regional FDI where firm A (B) undertakes FDI in country three (one), country four (two), or 
countries three and four (one and two). However, as shown in the appendix, it turns out that if 
the sunk cost of undertaking FDI is sufficiently large then the only possible outcome will be 
for the firms to undertake inter-regional export-platform FDI where firm A (B) undertakes 
FDI in country four (two) and supplies country three (one) from this factory. Each firm 
undertakes FDI in the country in the other region where its competitor does not have its 
factory. 
If both firms undertake inter-regional export-platform FDI, where firm A undertakes 
FDI in country four and firm B undertakes FDI in country two, then firm A (B) will have 
marginal cost c  in countries one and four (two and three) where it has a factory, and it will 
have marginal cost c t+  in countries two and three (one and four) where the product is 
exported from the factory in the other country in the region. It is straightforward to show that 
the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs are: 
 1 4 3 2 2 3 1 4
2,
3 3
F F F F F F F F
A A B B A A B B
c t c tx x x x x x x xα αβ β
− + − −= = = = = = = =  (4) 
For future reference, when comparing the volume of world trade, note that the total 
exports of firm A from its factories in countries one and four (and, by symmetry, the total 
exports of firm B from its factories in countries two and three) are: 
 ( )2 3 1 42 23F F F F F FA A A B B B
c t
X x x x x X
α
β
− −≡ + = = + ≡  (5) 
Using the Cournot duopoly equilibrium outputs (4) to solve for the gross profits 
(before the sunk cost, G ) of the two firms in the four markets yields: 
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 ( ) ( )2 21 4 2 3 2 3 1 4 2,9 9F F F F F F F FA A B B A A B B
c t c tα απ π π π π π π πβ β
− + − −= = = = = = = =  (6) 
Each firm decides how to supply the other region by comparing the profits from 
exporting with the profits from undertaking FDI (including the sunk cost, G ). The decision 
of each firm is unaffected by the by the decision of its competitor since the assumptions of 
segmented markets and constant marginal cost imply that the profits in the region where the 
firm is based are independent of whether the other region is supplied by exporting or 
undertaking FDI. For firm A (B), supplying region B (A) by undertaking FDI is more 
profitable than exporting if 3 4 3 4
F F E E
A A A AGπ π π π+ − > +  ( )1 2 1 2F F E EB B B BGπ π π π+ − > + . Hence, 
each firm will undertake FDI if the sunk cost of FDI is less than the critical value: 
 ( ) ( )1 8 4 0
9
G G k c k t t c kα αβ< ≡ − − − + − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (7) 
If G G<  then undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for both firms and both firms 
will undertake FDI in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. To determine how 
multilateral trade liberalisation affects the critical value of the sunk cost, differentiate G  in 
(7) with respect to the import tariff, t : 
 ( )4 3
9
G c k
t
αβ
∂ = − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂  (8) 
This is positive if the inter-regional transport cost is low, ( )* 3k k cα< ≡ − , and 
negative if the inter-regional transport cost is high, *k k> . Hence, multilateral trade 
liberalisation (a reduction in t ) may lead to a switch from undertaking FDI to exporting when 
the inter-regional transport cost is low, as shown in figure 1a, whereas it may lead to a switch 
from exporting to undertaking FDI when the inter-regional transport cost is high, as shown in 
figure 1b. This latter case may explain why multilateral trade liberalisation has led to an 
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increase in FDI. The effect of the switch from exporting to undertaking FDI on the volume of 
world trade in this industry can be seen by subtracting the volume of world trade when firms 
export, E EA BX X+  as in (2), from the volume of world trade when firms undertake FDI, 
F F
A BX X+  as in (5), which yields: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 3 03F F E EA B A BX X X X k cαβ+ − + = − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (9) 
Since the firms shift from exporting to undertaking FDI when the inter-regional 
transport cost is high, *k k> , this is positive so there is an increase in the volume of world 
trade in this industry. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition: If the inter-regional trade cost *k k>  then the critical value of the fixed 
cost G  is decreasing in the import tariff, 0G t∂ ∂ < . Hence, multilateral trade liberalisation 
may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI and increase the volume of 
world trade in this industry. 
4. Conclusions 
It has been shown that multilateral trade liberalisation may lead firms to shift from 
exporting to undertaking export-platform FDI when the inter-regional transport cost is high as 
it increases the profitability of undertaking FDI. This inter-regional FDI eliminates inter-
regional trade, but leads to an increase in intra-regional, intra-industry trade. The net result, 
when the inter-regional transport cost is high, is that the volume of world trade in this 
industry increases. Therefore, this model can explain why multilateral trade liberalisation has 
led to an increase in FDI and an increase in the volume of world trade. 
Appendix 
This appendix shows that the pattern of inter-regional FDI described above is the only 
possibility if the sunk cost of FDI is sufficiently large. 
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With intra-regional FDI, firm A could supply country two by undertaking FDI rather 
than exporting from country one. The profits from exporting to country two from its factory 
in country one are: 2
E
Aπ  in (3) whereas the profits from supplying country two by undertaking 
FDI in country two are: ( )22 9IA c k tπ α β= − + + . Hence, firm A will undertake FDI if the 
sunk cost of FDI is less than the critical value: ( )4 9IG t c kα β= − + , which is increasing in 
the import tariff and has a maximum value: ( )( )2 2 9MaxIG c k c kα α β= − + − −  at t t= . 
With inter-regional FDI, firm A can either build a factory in country three, where its 
competitor has a factory, or in country four, where its competitor does not have a factory. The 
profits in country three and four for firm A from undertaking FDI in country three are: 
( )23 2 9CA c tπ α β= − −  and ( )24 9CA c tπ α β= − + . The profits for firm A from undertaking 
FDI in country four are 3 4
F F
A Aπ π+  given by (6). It can be shown that 
( ) ( ) 23 4 3 4 4 9 0F F C CA A A A tπ π π π β+ − + = >  so it is always more profitable to undertake FDI in 
country four rather than country three. Also, firm A could undertake inter-regional FDI by 
building a factory in country three as well as country four. When deciding whether to invest 
in a second factory in region B, it would compare the profits from exporting to country three 
from its factory in country four, 3
F
Aπ  in (6), with the profits from undertaking FDI in country 
three: ( )23 9IIA cπ α β= − . It will invest in a second factory if the sunk cost of FDI is less than: 
( )4 9IIG t c tα β= − − , which has a maximum value of ( )2 24 9MaxIIG c kα β⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦  at t t= . 
The value of the critical value of the sunk cost of FDI, G  from (7), at the prohibitive 
import tariff, t t= , is ( ) ( )22 2 9t tG c k c kα α β= ⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦ , which is its minimum value if 
*k k> . It can be shown that: ( )( )2 9 0Max MaxI IIG G c c kα α β− = − − − > , and also that: 
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28 9 0Maxt t IG G k β= − = > . Hence, if the sunk cost of FDI is sufficiently large, 
Max Max
I IIG G G> > , then the pattern of inter-regional FDI described in the text is the only 
possibility. 
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